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This paper studies the existence of equilibrium solution concepts in a large
class of economic models with discontinuous payoff functions. The issue is
well understood for Nash equilibria, thanks to Reny’s better-reply security con-
dition (Reny 1999) and its recent improvements (Barelli and Meneghel 2013,
McLennan et al. 2011, Reny 2009, 2011). We propose new approaches, related
to Reny’s work, and obtain tight conditions for the existence of approximate equi-
libria and of sharing rule solutions in pure and mixed strategies (Simon and Zame
1990). As byproducts, we prove that many auction games with correlated types
admit an approximate equilibrium, and that many competition models have a
sharing rule solution.
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1. Introduction
Many economic interactions are modeled as games with discontinuous payoff func-
tions. For example, in timing games, price and spatial competitions, auctions, bargain-
ing, preemption games, or wars of attrition, discontinuities occur when firms choose
the same price, location, bid, or acting time. The objective of this paper is to extend
and link conditions under which Nash, approximate, and sharing rule equilibria exist in
such games.
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Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where each agent is reacting optimally to
other players’ plans. Mathematically, it is a fixed point of the best-response corre-
spondence. When payoff functions are continuous and quasiconcave, an application of
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem leads to the Nash–Glicksberg theorem (Glicksberg 1952,
Nash 1950, 1951). In discontinuous games, the Kakutani approach cannot be directly
applied because a player may have no optimal reply or because his best choice jumps as
a function of the choices of the other players.1
A natural issue then is to identify regularity conditions on payoffs, which, combined
with quasiconcavity of the payoff functions, guarantee the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium. The first existence conditions are given by the seminal papers of Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986a, 1986b). A significant breakthrough2 is achieved by Reny (1999) via the
better-reply security approach.
Quoting Reny, “A game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x∗
and every payoff vector limit u∗ resulting from strategies approaching x∗, some player
i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u∗i even if the others deviate slightly
from x∗.”
Reny’s paper generated a large literature. For instance, Barelli and Meneghel (2013)
and McLennan et al. (2011) proposed relaxations that cover non-quasiconcave prefer-
ences. Reny (2009, 2011) proposed new refinements for games in mixed strategies us-
ing a strategic approximation methodology. Recently, Barelli et al. (2014) applied Reny’s
better-reply security and strategic approximation techniques to prove the existence of
the value in a Colonel Blotto game.
But what if a Nash equilibrium does not exist? Two related relaxations of Nash equi-
librium have been studied in the literature: endogenous sharing rules and approximate
equilibria.
In many discontinuous games, the exogenously given tie-breaking rule leads to
games without pure Nash equilibria (e.g., asymmetric Bertrand duopoly, Hotelling lo-
cation game) or without mixed Nash equilibria (e.g., three-player preemption games
(Laraki et al. 2005), auctions with correlated types or values (Fang and Morris 2006,
Jackson 2009)). However, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is restored if the tie-
breaking rule is chosen endogenously (Andreoni et al. 2007, Maskin and Riley 2000,
Simon and Zame 1990). For example, in an asymmetric Bertrand duopoly, a pure Nash
equilibrium exists if ties are broken in favor of the lower cost firm. In first-price auctions
with complete information, a pure Nash equilibrium exists if ties are broken in favor of
the bidder with the highest value. Under mild topological conditions, Simon and Zame
(1990) proved that to every game, one could associate an auxiliary game that admits a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies and where payoffs in the two games only differ at
discontinuity points (see Section 2 for a formal definition). Jackson et al. (2002) remark
that their “results concern only the existence of solutions [sharing rule] in mixed strate-
gies” and that they “have little to say about the existence of solutions in pure strategies.”
1Another approach, not considered in this paper, is to use ordered fixed point theory (e.g., Tarski’s theo-
rem) to obtain the existence of Nash equilibria in supermodular games (Topkis 1979).
2Carmona (2009) gives an extension of Dasgupta and Maskin’s results, which is unrelated to Reny’s ap-
proach.
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We prove the existence of a sharing rule solution in pure strategies in every quasiconcave
and compact game (see Theorem 3.4).
An alternative solution for games without a Nash equilibrium is the notion of ap-
proximate equilibrium. It is a limit strategy profile x∗ and a limit payoff vector u∗ of
ε-Nash equilibria xε with associated payoff vector u(xε), as ε goes to 0.
There are many games without a Nash equilibrium but with a reasonable approxi-
mate equilibrium. In first-price auctions with complete information, for example, a nat-
ural approximate equilibrium arises if the player with the highest value proposes a bid
slightly above the second highest value, and if the other players bid exactly their value.
Another example is Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs, where in every approxi-
mate equilibria in pure strategies the most efficient firm proposes a price slightly below
the marginal cost of the opponent.
There are few results in the literature establishing the existence of approximate equi-
libria, one of which is due to Reny (1995) and Prokopovych (2011).3 While theoretically
interesting, it requires assumptions that are not always satisfied in applications (as will
be seen).
In this paper, we define a game G to be approximately better-reply secure if for every
nonapproximate equilibrium strategy profile x∗ and every payoff vector limit u∗ result-
ing from strategies approaching x∗, some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly
above u∗i , even if the others deviate slightly from x
∗.
We prove that every approximately better-reply secure quasiconcave compact game
admits an approximate equilibrium. An example is given by the class of diagonal
games, which encompasses many models of competition (in price, time, location, or
quantity): each player, i = 1    N , chooses a real number xi in [01]. The payoff of
player i is fi(xiφ(x−i)) if xi < φ(x−i), gi(xiφ(x−i)) if xi > φ(x−i), and hi(xix−i) if
xi = φ(x−i), where fi : [01]2 → R, gi : [01]2 → R, and φ : [01]N−1 → R are contin-
uous functions. For example, in first-price auctions, fi = 0, gi(xix−i) = vi − xi, and
φ(xix−i)= maxj =i xj . In second-price auctions, gi(xix−i)= vi −maxj =i xj (where vi is
the value of the object for player i).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the main results for the
existence of a solution in discontinuous games: Reny’s better-reply security (Reny 1999)
for the existence of Nash equilibria, the sharing rule solution of Simon and Zame (1990),
and Reny and Prokopovych’s conditions (Reny 1995, Prokopovych 2011) for the existence
of an approximate equilibrium. Section 3 is dedicated to quasiconcave compact games
in pure strategies. We introduce the new concept of Reny solution, which weakens the
Nash equilibrium concept, and we prove its existence for every discontinuous game.
This solution is used to construct pure sharing rule solutions and approximate equilib-
ria. The results are illustrated in the class of diagonal games. Section 4 is dedicated to
compact metric games in mixed strategies. We prove that the intersection of the sets of
Reny solutions and sharing rule solutions is nonempty and contains the set of approx-
imate equilibria. In addition, we prove that in every approximately better-reply secure
3Historically, Reny proved this result in an unpublished working paper (Reny 1995). Independently,
Prokopovych (2011) proved the same result with a different technique.
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game, approximate equilibria may be obtained as limits of Nash equilibria of an endoge-
nously chosen sequence of discretizations of the game. This is a natural extension of a
similar result established by Reny (2009, 2011) for Nash equilibria. As applications, we
prove the existence of a mixed approximate equilibrium in multi-player auctions with
correlated types and in two-player auctions with interdependent types and values.
2. Three standard approaches to discontinuous games
A game in strategic form G = ((Xi)i∈N (ui)i∈N) is given by a finite set N of players,
and for each player i ∈ N , a nonempty set Xi of pure strategies and a payoff func-
tion ui : X = ∏i∈N Xi → R. This paper assumes G to be compact, that is, for every
i, Xi is a compact subset of a topological vector space, and ui is bounded. We let
Vi(x−i) := supdi∈Xi ui(dix−i) denote the greatest payoff that player i can get against
x−i = (xj)j =i ∈X−i :=∏j =i Xj .
Definition 2.1. A pair (x v) ∈ X × RN is a Nash equilibrium of G (and x is a Nash
equilibrium profile) if v= u(x) and for every player i ∈N , Vi(x−i)= vi.
The game G is quasiconcave if for every player i ∈ N , Xi is convex and for every
x−i ∈ X−i, the mapping ui(·x−i) is quasiconcave. The game is continuous if for every
i ∈N , ui is a continuous function.4
Theorem 2.2 (Glicksberg 1952). Every continuous, quasiconcave, and compact game
admits a Nash equilibrium.
The rest of the section presents three extensions of this result when payoffs are dis-
continuous. Our paper combines them into one general idea.
2.1 Better-reply secure game
In many discontinuous games, a Nash equilibrium exists (symmetric Bertrand compe-
tition, auctions with private values, and wars of attrition, among many). Reny’s theorem
provides an explanation for this (Reny 1999). Formally, we let = {(xu(x)) : x ∈X} de-
note the graph of G and let  be the closure of . Since X is compact and u is bounded, 
is a compact subset of X×RN . Define the “secure payoff level” of player i at (dix−i) ∈X
as
ui(dix−i) := lim inf
x′−i→x−i
ui(dix
′
−i) := sup
V ∈V(x−i)
inf
x′−i∈V
ui(dix
′
−i)
where V(x−i) denotes the set of neighborhoods of x−i. This is the payoff that di can
almost guarantee to player i if his opponents play any profile close enough to x−i. We let
Vi(x−i) := supdi∈Xi ui(dix−i) denote the largest payoff that player i can secure against
x−i.
4Set X is endowed with the product topology.
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Definition 2.3. A game G is better-reply secure if whenever (x v) ∈  and x is not a
Nash equilibrium profile, some player i ∈ N can secure5 a payoff strictly above vi, i.e.,
V i(x−i) > vi.
Theorem 2.4 (Reny 1999). Every better-reply secure, quasiconcave, and compact game
admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Since every continuous game is obviously better-reply secure, this extends Glicks-
berg’s theorem. In his paper, Reny gives two practical conditions that, together, imply
better-reply security (see Theorem 2.6 below).
Definition 2.5. (i) Game G is payoff secure if Vi(x−i)= Vi(x−i).
(ii) Game G is reciprocally upper semicontinuous if, whenever (x v) ∈  and ui(x)≤
vi for every i, then u(x)= v.
Equivalently, G is payoff secure if for every x ∈ X and for every ε > 0, every player
i ∈N can secure a payoff above ui(x)− ε.
Theorem 2.6. Every payoff secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous game is better-
reply secure.
2.2 Approximate equilibrium
In first-price auctions with complete information, bidding slightly above the second
highest evaluation for the bidder with the highest evaluation yields an approximate
equilibrium. One of the main goals of this paper is to develop theoretical tools to extend
this existence result to a large class of auctions.
Definition 2.7. A pair (x v) ∈  is an approximate equilibrium (and x is an approxi-
mate equilibrium profile) if there exists a sequence (xn)n∈N of X and a sequence (εn)n∈N
of positive real numbers, converging to 0, such that the following statements hold:
(i) For every n ∈ N, xn is an εn-equilibrium: ∀i ∈N , ∀di ∈Xi, ui(dixn−i)≤ ui(xn)+ εn.
(ii) The sequence (xnu(xn)) converges to (x v).
In zero-sum games, the existence of an approximate equilibrium is equivalent to
the existence of the value. Every Nash equilibrium is obviously an approximate equilib-
rium (take a constant sequence in the definition above). Let us state one of the very few
existing results in the literature.6
5The following definitions are standard: Player i can secure a payoff above α ∈ R if there exists di ∈ Xi
and a neighborhood V−i of x−i such that for every x′−i ∈ V−i, ui(dix′−i) ≥ α. Player i can secure a payoff
strictly above α ∈ R if he can secure a payoff above α+ ε for some ε > 0. We give equivalent formulations
using Vi and V i .
6Ziad (1997) proposes another existence theorem of approximate equilibria, unrelated to our work. See
also Carmona (2010, 2011) and Reny (1995).
84 Bich and Laraki Theoretical Economics 12 (2017)
Definition 2.8. A game G has the marginal continuity property at x ∈ X if for every
i ∈N , Vi(x−i) is a continuous function at x−i. If this holds for every x, the game has the
marginal continuity property.
Theorem 2.9 (Reny 1995 and Prokopovych 2011). Every payoff secure, quasiconcave
compact game that has the marginal continuity property admits an approximate equi-
librium.
This theorem applies to first-price auctions and asymmetric Bertrand duopoly.
However, the following location game (Simon and Zame 1990) is not payoff secure, but
admits an approximate equilibrium.
Example 2.10 (California location game). This example was introduced by Simon and
Zame (1990). The length interval [04] represents an interstate highway. The strategy
set of player 1 (a psychologist from California) is X = [03] (representing the Californian
highway stretch). The strategy set of player 2 (a psychologist from Oregon) is Y = [34]
(the Oregon part of the highway). The payoff function of player 1 is u1(x y)= (x+ y)/2
if x < y and u1(33) = 2. The payoff function of player 2 is u2(x y) = 4 − u1(x y). The
strategy profile xn = (3−1/n3), corresponding to the vector payoff vn = (3−1/(2n)1+
1/(2n)), is a 1/(2n) equilibrium. Consequently, (x= (33) v = (31)) is an approximate
equilibrium. However, the game is not payoff secure for player 2 at x= (33). ♦
2.3 Sharing rule solutions
Simon and Zame show that even if a game does not have a Nash equilibrium, it is always
possible to slightly change the payoffs at discontinuity points so that the new game has
a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Example 2.11 (California location game, continued). In the California location game,
define a new payoff function q as q(x)= u(x) for every x = (33) and q(33)= (31). The
pure strategy profile (33) with payoff (31) is a Nash equilibrium of the game defined
by q. The new sharing rule at x = (33) has a simple interpretation: it corresponds to
giving each psychologist his/her natural market share. Moreover, this is exactly the pre-
diction of the approximate equilibrium in Example 2.10. We will prove that this property
is very general: every approximate equilibrium is a sharing rule equilibrium (see Theo-
rem 3.10). ♦
To prove the existence of a solution, Simon and Zame do not require the game to
be quasiconcave. However, they allow the use of mixed strategies. Formally, G is metric
if strategy sets are Hausdorff and metrizable and payoff functions are measurable. De-
note by Mi = (Xi) the set of Borel probability measures on Xi (usually called the set
of mixed strategies of player i). This is a compact Hausdorff metrizable set under the
weak* topology. Let M =∏i Mi.
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Definition 2.12. A mixed Nash equilibrium of G is a pure Nash equilibrium of its
mixed extension G′ = ((Mi)i∈N (ui)i∈N), where payoff functions are extended multilin-
early to M .
Definition 2.13. A pair (mq) is a mixed sharing rule solution of G if m ∈M is a mixed
Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game G˜= ((Xi)i∈N (qi)i∈N), where the auxiliary mea-
surable payoff functions q= (qi)i∈N must satisfy the condition
(SR) ∀x ∈X q(x) ∈ cox
where x = {v ∈RN : (x v) ∈ } is the x section of  and co stands for the convex hull.
Condition (SR) has two implications: if u is continuous at x, q(x) = u(x); if∑
i∈N ui(x) is continuous, then
∑
i∈N qi(x)=
∑
i∈N ui(x) (justifying the terminology
“sharing rule”).
Theorem 2.14 (Simon and Zame 1990). Every compact metric game admits a mixed
sharing rule solution.
Jackson et al. (2002) extend Simon and Zame’s theorem to games with incomplete in-
formation. In their paper, they interpret a tie-breaking rule as a proxy for the outcome of
an unmodeled second stage game. As an example, they recall the analysis of first-price
auctions with incomplete information for a single indivisible object. Maskin and Riley
(2000) add to the sealed-bid stage a second stage where bidders with the greatest bid in
the first stage play a Vickrey auction. In the private value setting, their dominant strat-
egy is to bid their true values. Consequently, the second stage induces a tie-breaking rule
where the bidder with the highest value wins the object. More generally, a tie-breaking
rule may be implemented by asking players to send a cheap message (their private val-
ues in auctions) in addition to their strategies (bids). The messages will be used only to
break ties (as in the second stage of Maskin and Riley’s mechanism).
When the game is continuous, the new and the original games coincide, and so we
recover the Nash–Glicksberg theorem in mixed strategies.
Theorem 2.15 (Nash–Glicksberg theorem in mixed strategies). Every continuous, met-
ric compact game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium.
In the next section, we prove the existence of a pure sharing rule solution, which we
define now.
Definition 2.16. A pair (xq) is a pure sharing rule solution if x ∈ X is a pure Nash
equilibrium of the auxiliary game G˜ = ((Xi)i∈N (qi)i∈N), where the auxiliary payoff
functions q= (qi)i∈N must satisfy the condition7
(SR strong) ∀y ∈X q(y) ∈ y
7If (mq) is a mixed sharing rule solution and m ∈X is also a pure strategy, then (mq) may not be a pure
sharing rule solution (because q may not satisfy (SR strong)), but the converse implication is always true.
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If G is metric, condition (SR strong) requires that for every strategy profile y, there
exists a sequence (yn) converging to y such that q(y) = limn u(yn). On one hand, our
condition is stronger than the original condition (SR) because one always has y ⊂ coy .
On the other hand, to prove the existence of a pure sharing rule solution, we need payoff
functions to be quasiconcave.
To allow comparison between sharing rule solution and approximate equilibrium,
we introduce the following terminology.
Definition 2.17. A pair (mv) ∈M×RN (resp. (x v) ∈X×RN ) is called a mixed (resp.
pure) sharing rule equilibrium if (mq) is a mixed (resp. pure) sharing rule solution for
some q and q(m)= v.
The proof of the existence of a pure sharing rule equilibrium is a direct consequence
of the existence of a Reny solution, which is defined in the next subsection.
3. Existence of solutions for games in pure strategies
As discussed above, sharing rule and approximate equilibrium concepts are alternative
solutions for games without a Nash equilibrium. Both are defined on  (the closure of
the graph of the game). To prove their existence, we use a new concept—Reny solution—
defined on .
3.1 Existence of a reny solution
In the following definition, recall that Vi(x−i) := supdi∈Xi ui(dix−i).
Definition 3.1. A pair (x v) ∈  is a Reny solution if for every i ∈ N , Vi(x−i) ≤ vi. The
strategy profile x ∈X is a Reny solution profile if (x v) ∈  is a Reny solution for some v.
Example 3.2 (Two-player first-price auctions). Both players i = 12 choose a bid xi ∈
[01] and receive a payoff:
ui(xixj)=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
wi − xi if xi > xj
wi−xi
2 if xi = xj
0 if xi < xj ♦
If w1 ∈ ]01[ (the value of player 1) is higher than w2 ∈ ]01[ (the value of player 2),
then the above game is quasiconcave, and every (x1x2 v1 v2) = (y yw1 − y0) is a
Reny solution whenever y ∈ [w2w1]. To see this, note first that the game is payoff secure;
thus a Reny solution (x v)= (x1x2 v1 v2) ∈  satisfies
sup
di∈[01]
ui(dix−i)≤ vi i= 12 (1)
Since this game has no Nash equilibrium, x1 is equal to x2 (otherwise ui would be
continuous at x = (x1x2), and (1) would imply that x is a Nash equilibrium). More-
over, each player can get a payoff of at least 0 by playing 0. Consequently, v1 and v2 are
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nonnegative. From (x v) ∈  , (v1 v2)= limn→+∞(u1(xn)u2(xn)) for some sequence of
profiles xn = (xn1xn2) converging to (x1x1). There are three cases (up to a subsequence),
depending on whether the sequence converges to x from above, along the diagonal, or
from below. In the two first cases, we get v= (0w2−x1) or v= ((w1−x1)/2 (w2−x1)/2);
thus x2 = x1 ≤ w2 < 1 (since v2 is nonnegative). Then, playing slightly above x1 gives
a payoff strictly above v1 for player 1, which contradicts (1). In the last case, v =
(w1−x10); thus x1 ≤w1. Then (1) implies that x1 ≥w2 (otherwise player 2 could do bet-
ter than 0 by playing slightly above x1). Conversely, it is easy to check that (y yw1−y0)
is a Reny solution when y ∈ [w2w1].
In this example, the set of Reny solutions coincides with the set of approximate
equilibria (playing y ∈ [w2w1] for player 2 and slightly above for player 1 is an ε-
equilibrium). Note that there are several Reny solutions and thus several approximate
equilibria, but multiplicity also happens for Nash equilibria: in this example with a
second-price auction mechanism, playing y for player 2 and w1 for player 1 is a Nash
equilibrium for all y ∈ [0w1).
Theorem 3.3. For every quasiconcave and compact game G, the set of Reny solutions is
nonempty and compact, and it contains the set of Nash equilibria. Moreover,G is better-
reply secure if and only if Nash equilibrium profiles and Reny solution profiles coincide.
Observe that a Nash equilibrium (xu(x)) is a Reny solution because Vi(x−i) ≤
Vi(x−i), and by Nash conditions, Vi(x−i) ≤ ui(x). Moreover, if the game is continu-
ous, then Reny solutions and Nash equilibria coincide because Vi(x−i) = Vi(x−i) and
u(x)= v.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. The existence of a Reny solution is a straightforward con-
sequence of Reny’s theorem (Reny 1999). Indeed, assume, by contradiction, that there
is no Reny solution. This implies that the game is better-reply secure. Consequently,
by Reny’s theorem, there exists a Nash equilibrium, which is a Reny solution: a contra-
diction. Compactness of the set of Reny solutions is due to the lower semicontinuity of
Vi, and the last assertion of Theorem 3.3 is a consequence of the definition of better-
reply security. Actually, if the game is better-reply secure, a Reny solution profile must
be a Nash equilibrium profile because otherwise, better-reply security contradicts Reny
solution condition. Conversely, if Nash equilibrium profiles and Reny solution profiles
coincide, then for every x ∈ X that is not a Nash equilibrium profile, x is not a Reny
solution profile; thus better-reply security condition is satisfied. 
As an illustration, we can revisit the result of Reny in Theorem 2.6 and prove that
whenever a game is payoff secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous, it is better-
reply secure. Actually, assume (x v) to be a Reny solution. Thus, for every i ∈ N ,
Vi(x−i) ≤ vi. Since the game is payoff secure, Vi(x−i) = Vi(x−i) ≤ vi. Since ui(x) ≤
Vi(x−i), one has ui(x)≤ vi for every i ∈N . By reciprocal upper semicontinuity, v= u(x),
and so Vi(x−i)≤ ui(x) for every i ∈N . Consequently, (x v) is a Nash equilibrium.
Two major applications of the Reny solution are presented in the next subsections.
In Section 3.2, the Reny solution allows the existence of a pure sharing rule equilibrium
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to be proved in every quasiconcave compact game. In Section 3.3, the Reny solution is
used to prove the existence of approximate equilibria in a number of economic models.
3.2 Existence of a sharing rule equilibrium
The existence of a Reny solution allows the open problem in Jackson et al. (2002) to be
solved.
Theorem 3.4. Every Reny solution is a pure sharing rule equilibrium. In particular, ev-
ery quasiconcave and compact gameG admits a pure sharing rule solution.
Remark 3.5. Observe that a pure sharing rule solution (mq′) of G′ (the mixed exten-
sion of G) is not a mixed sharing rule solution à la Simon and Zame of G because the
new payoff profile q′ is defined on M and not on X , and q′ is not necessarily the multi-
linear extension of a pure strategy payoff profile. Thus, our result does not imply the
Simon–Zame theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. To prove Theorem 3.4, consider a Reny solution (x v) ∈ .
Then we can build a sharing rule solution as follows. For every i ∈ N and di ∈ Xi, de-
note by S(dix−i) the space of sequences8 (xn−i)n∈N of X−i converging to x−i such that
limn→+∞ ui(dixn−i)= ui(dix−i). Then define q :X →RN by
q(y)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
v if y = x
any limit point of (u(dixn−i))n∈N
if y = (dix−i) for some i ∈Ndi = xi (xn−i)n∈N ∈ S(dix−i)
q(y)= u(y) otherwise.
Now let us prove that (xq) is a pure sharing rule solution. Since (x v) ∈ , and
by definition of q, condition (SR strong) of Definition 2.16 is satisfied at x (this would
be false if the definition of q in the second case above was qj(dix−i) = uj(dix−i), j =
1     n). Obviously, it is satisfied at every y different from x for at least two components,
and also at every (dix−i) with di = xi, from the definition of q(dix−i) in this case. 
Remark 3.6. Thus, Reny solution refines pure sharing rule equilibrium, and the refine-
ment is strict as the following better-reply secure game shows. A player maximizes over
[01] the discontinuous payoff function u(x) = 0 if x < 1 and u(1) = 1. If q(y) = 0 for
every y, then (xq) is a pure sharing rule solution for every x ∈ [01]. Yet the only Reny
solution is (x v)= (11), and it coincides with the unique Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3.7. An important question, raised by De Castro (2011) and Carmona and
Podczeck (2014), is whether for every game G one can define a new payoff function
q(y) ∈ co(y), inducing a better-reply secure game. The mapping q defined in the proof
8If X is not first countable, one should consider the space of nets instead of sequences.
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of Theorem 3.4 does not answer the question that if (x v) ∈  is the Reny solution con-
sidered in this proof, then q is equal to the initial payoff mapping u at every y ∈X differ-
ent from x for at least two components. Since u is arbitrarily discontinuous, there is no
hope, in general, that q defines a better-reply secure game.
De Castro (2011) proposes a first answer: he introduces a regularity property—
a weakening of better-reply security—as follows: a game is regular if for every (x v) ∈ ,
if vi ≥ Vi(x−i) for all i ∈ N , then ui(x) = Vi(x−i) for all i ∈ N . Then he proves that ev-
ery discontinuous game has a measurable selection q(y) ∈ co(y) that induces a regular
game. This result cannot be applied to prove Theorem 3.4 because a regular game may
have no Nash equilibrium.
Another approach is given by Carmona and Podczeck (2014) through the concept
of virtual continuity. However, they consider the case of better-reply security in mixed
strategies. Consequently, this is not directly related to Theorem 3.4.
Remark 3.8. Actually, the pure sharing rule solution (xq) built in the proof of The-
orem 3.4 satisfies the additional property9 qi(dix−i) ≥ ui(dix−i) for every i ∈ N and
every di ∈ Xi. This property says that q remains above the secure payoff level in the
original game.
Application 3.9 (Shared resource games). The payoff of each player i ∈N can be writ-
ten as ui(xix−i)= Fi(xi Si(xix−i)), where Fi :Xi ×R→ R and Si :X → R (the shared
resource of player i). The total amount of the resource
∑N
i=1 Si is a (possibly discontinu-
ous) function of the strategy profile x ∈X . This game G was introduced to model fiscal
competition for mobile capital (Rothstein 2007).
A sharing rule of G is defined to be a family (S˜i)i∈N of functions from X to R such
that for every strategy profile x ∈ X , there is a sequence (xn) converging to x such that
for every player i, S˜i(x)= limn→∞ Si(xn). Theorem 3.4 implies the following extension of
Rothstein’s results. Assuming G to be quasiconcave and compact, Fi continuous, and Si
bounded for every player i, we get the existence of a new sharing rule (S˜i)i∈N whose asso-
ciated game u˜i(xix−i) = Fi(xi S˜i(xix−i)) admits a pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
under the following assumptions, every Nash equilibrium of G˜ is a Nash equilibrium10
of G:
A1. For all xi ∈Xi, Fi(xi si) is nondecreasing in si.
A2. For all x−i ∈X−i, supdi∈Xi:(dix−i)∈Ci ui(dix−i)= supdi∈Xi ui(dix−i), where Ci is the
set of continuity points of Si.
A3. If x /∈ ⋂i∈N Ci, supdi∈Xi ui(dix−i) > Fi(xi limsupx′→x
∑N
i=1 Si(x′)/N) for every
i ∈N .
9Indeed, if di = xi , then qi(dix−i)= qi(x) = vi ≥ ui(x) because (x v) is a Reny solution. If di = xi , then
qi(dix−i)= ui(dix−i).
10Indeed, for every Nash equilibrium x of G˜, one has supdi∈Xi ui(dix−i) ≤ supdi∈Xi Fi(di S˜i(dix−i)) ≤
Fi(xi S˜i(x)) for every player i. The first inequality is a consequence of A2 and the definition of S˜i. If x ∈ Ci
for every i, then S˜i(x) = Si(x), and x is a Nash equilibrium of the initial game G. Otherwise, from A1 and
A3, we get limsupx′→x
∑N
i=1 Si(x′)/N < S˜i(x) for every i ∈ N . Summing these inequalities contradicts the
definition of S˜i.
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In his paper, Rothstein says “the work of Simon and Zame (1990) is directly applica-
ble, but only to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies with an
endogenous sharing rule.” By Theorem 3.4, the game has a pure endogenous sharing
rule equilibrium.
3.3 Existence of an approximate equilibrium
Theorem 3.10. Every approximate equilibrium is a Reny solution and, therefore, also a
pure sharing rule equilibrium.
Proof. Let (xn)n∈N be a sequence of εn equilibria such that (xnu(xn)) converges to
(x v). By definition, ui(dixn−i) ≤ ui(xn) + εn for every n ∈ N, every player i ∈ N , and
every deviation di ∈Xi. Passing to the infimum limit when n tends to infinity, we obtain
ui(dix−i)≤ vi. Thus, (x v) is a Reny solution, and also a pure sharing rule equilibrium
by Theorem 3.4. 
This leads to the following definition.
Definition 3.11. A game G is approximately better-reply secure if whenever (x v) ∈
 and x is not an approximate equilibrium profile, some player i can secure a payoff
strictly above vi.
The existence of a Reny solution implies the following result.
Theorem 3.12. Every approximately better-reply secure quasiconcave and compact
game admits an approximate equilibrium.
The California location game is approximately better-reply secure. This theorem
provides a local version of Reny–Prokopovych’s theorem (described in Section 2.2).
Corollary 3.13. If (x v) is a Reny solution and if, at x, the game is payoff secure and
has the marginal continuity property, then (x v) is an approximate equilibrium.
Proof. Actually, if (x v) is a Reny solution, then
sup
di∈Xi
ui(dix−i)= sup
di∈Xi
ui(dix−i)≤ vi
the equality being a consequence of payoff security at x. Since v = limxn→x u(xn) for
some sequence xn, the local continuity of supdi∈Xi ui(dix−i) with respect to x guaran-
tees that (x v) is an approximate equilibrium. 
This corollary implies Reny–Prokopovych’s theorem, and is useful in practice as the
following application shows.
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Application 3.14 (Diagonal games). For every i ∈ N , we let fi, gi be continuous map-
pings from [01] × [01] to R, and let hi : [01]N →R be a bounded mapping. The payoff
of player i is
ui(xix−i)=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
fi(xiφ(x−i)) if φ(x−i) > xi
gi(xiφ(x−i)) if φ(x−i) < xi
hi(xix−i) if φ(x−i)= xi
where φ : [01]N−1 → [01] is a continuous aggregation function, i.e., a function that ag-
gregates theN−1 strategies of the opponents into one strategy in [01]. This aggregation
function must satisfy11 for every (y z) ∈ [01]N−1 × [01]N−1 and t ∈ [01] the follwing
conditions:
Monotonicity. If y ≤ z, then φ(y)≤φ(z); if y  z then φ(y) < φ(z).
Anonymity. For every permutation σ of {1    N − 1}, we have φ(y1     yN−1) =
φ(yσ(1)     yσ(N−1)).
Unanimity. We have φ(t     t)= t.
Representativity.12 If φ(y) > 0 and yi > 0 for some i, then φ(zi y−i) > 0 for every
zi > 0. Similarly, if φ(y) < 1 and yi < 1 for some i, then φ(zi y−i) < 1 for every zi < 1.
These four properties are satisfied, for example, when φ is one of the functions
• φ1(y)=max{y1 y2     yN−1},
• φ2(y)=min{y1 y2     yN−1},
• φ3(y)= 1/(N − 1)∑N−1j=1 yj ,
• ψk(y)= {kth highest value of {y1     yN−1}}, k= 1    N − 1.
Diagonal games include many models of competition with complete information. For
example, in one-unit auctions, φ = φ1; in k-unit auctions, φ = ψk; in wars of attrition,
preemption, or Bertrand competition, φ=φ2.
Theorem 3.15. Every quasiconcave diagonal game satisfying condition (C) below is ap-
proximately better-reply secure; thus it possesses an approximate equilibrium.
(C) There is α ∈ ]0 12 [ such that for every x ∈ [01]N and i ∈N , if xi =φ(x−i), then there
is αi(x) ∈ ]α1−α[ such that hi(x)= αi(x)fi(xiφ(x−i))+(1−αi(x))gi(xiφ(x−i)).
Condition (C) means that hi is a strict convex combination of gi and fi with weights that
are bounded below. In auctions, for example, the winner is usually decided uniformly
among highest bidders; thus the payoff of a player in the case of ties is a strict convex
combination between his payoff if he wins, gi, and if he looses, fi. The coefficient of the
convex combination depends on how many players are tied, inducing a discontinuity
on hi. The probability of being selected or not selected is bounded below by 1/N = α.
11For every (x y) ∈ [01]N−1 × [01]N−1, x  y (resp. x ≤ y) means xi < yi (resp. xi ≤ yi) for every i ∈
{1    N − 1}.
12We denote (zi y−i) := (y1     yi−1 zi yi+1     yN−1).
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Hereafter, we give a sketch of the proof of Theorem 3.15. See Appendix A.1 for a
detailed proof.
Under assumption (C), the game is payoff secure. Consequently, if (x v) ∈  is a
Reny solution, then
sup
di∈[01]
ui(dix−i)≤ vi i ∈N
To prove that x is an approximate equilibrium profile, one has to check four different
cases: first, if xi = φ(x−i) for every i, then the payoff functions are continuous at x,
v = u(x), and the equation above defining Reny solution implies that (x v) is a Nash
equilibrium. Second, if there exists i such that xi = φ(x−i) ∈ ]01[, then anonymity,
representativity, and monotonicity give φ(x−j) ∈ ]01[ for every j. Then the marginal
continuity property is satisfied at x, and from Corollary 3.13, (x v) is an approximate
equilibrium. Third, assume there is a player i such that xi = φ(x−i) = 0. By anonymity
and monotonicity, φ(x−j) = 0 for every j ∈ N . Let (xn)n∈N be a sequence such that
(xnu(xn)) → (x v). Define a sequence of profiles (yn)n∈N as follows: let j ∈ N be any
player. If vj ≤ fj(00) and xj = 0, define ynj := 0 for every n. Otherwise, define ynj := xnj for
every n. We check that yn is an εn equilibrium for some εn → 0. In the last case, there is
a player i ∈N such that xi =φ(x−i)= 1: this is similar to the third case.
4. Existence of solutions for games in mixed strategies
We let G be a metric compact game, let G′ be its mixed extension, and let ′ be the
closure of the graph ofG′. As previously defined,Mi = (Xi) is the set of mixed strategies
of player i. This is a compact Hausdorff metrizable set under the weak* topology. Let
M =∏i Mi.
A Reny solution (resp. an approximate equilibrium) of G′ is called a mixed Reny
solution (resp. approximate mixed equilibrium) of G. A mixed Reny solution always
exists from Theorem 3.3 because G′ is compact and quasiconcave.
In the next subsection, we establish a formal link between the set of Reny solutions
of G′ and the set of mixed sharing rule equilibria (as defined by Simon and Zame origi-
nally; see Definitions 2.13 and 2.17 above) by proving that the intersection of these sets is
nonempty. Then we prove that if G′ is approximately better-reply secure, some approxi-
mate equilibria can be obtained as limits of Nash equilibria of finite discretizations of the
initial game. The approximation methodology is illustrated in auctions with correlated
types or values.
4.1 Linking approximate and Simon–Zame equilibria with Reny solutions
The intersection of mixed Reny solutions and mixed sharing rule equilibria permits us
to localize mixed approximate equilibria, as the following theorem proves (see the proof
in Appendix A.2).
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Theorem 4.1. Mixed approximate equilibria are always in the intersection of mixed
Reny solutions and mixed sharing rule equilibria.13
Importantly, this intersection is always nonempty, which is a consequence of a sim-
ple limit argument we now explain. We let D0 be the set of all finite subsets
∏
i∈N Di
of M . Consider the inclusion relationship on D0: it is reflexive, transitive, and binary.
Then each pair
∏
i∈N Di and
∏
i∈N D′i in D0 has an upper bound
∏
i∈N(Di ∪ D′i) in D0.
The pair (D0⊂) is called a directed set. To every D =∏i∈N Di ∈ D0, we can associate
(mDu(mD)), where mD is a mixed Nash equilibrium of the finite game restricted to D.
This defines a mapping14 fromD0 to ′, called a net (of ′). A limit point (mv) ∈ ′ of this
net, denoted (mDu(mD))D∈D0 , is defined by the following property: for every neighbor-
hood Vmv of (mv) and every D =∏i∈N Di ∈ D0, there exists D′ ∈ D0 with D ⊂ D′ such
that (mD
′
u(mD
′
)) ∈ Vmv.
Definition 4.2. A pair (mv) ∈ ′ is a limit equilibrium of G′ if it is a limit point of a net
(mDu(mD))D∈D0 of mixed Nash equilibria of the finite game restricted to D.
Theorem 4.3. Every compact metric game has a limit equilibrium. Every limit equi-
librium is a mixed Reny solution and is a mixed sharing rule equilibrium. Conse-
quently, the intersection betweenmixed Reny solutions andmixed sharing rule equilibria
is nonempty, and ifG′ is better-reply secure, then every limit equilibrium is a mixed Nash
equilibrium.
The existence of a limit equilibrium is obvious and is a consequence of the compact-
ness of ′. The rest of the proof is presented in the Appendix and is an adaptation of the
arguments of Simon and Zame.
Remark 4.4. Observe that this provides a very short and constructive proof of Reny’s
existence result for games in mixed strategies (Reny 1999) because if G′ is better-reply
secure, every limit equilibrium is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Weak strategic approximation
The idea of using a sequence of finite games to detect Nash equilibria goes back to
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a). This has been formalized by Reny (2011) in the class
of better-reply secure games via the notion of strategic approximation. We can extend
this method to approximately better-reply secure games.
13From Section 3, this is also true in pure strategies. Nevertheless, it cannot be directly proved by apply-
ing Section 3 to G′, simply because a pure sharing rule equilibrium of G′ may not be a mixed sharing rule
equilibrium of G.
14By definition, mD = (mDi )i∈N is an element of
∏
i∈N ((Xi)). More precisely, it is a profile of probabil-
ity measures on finite subsets of (Xi), where i ∈N . Given i ∈N , let {σ1    σK} be the support of mDi and
let p1    pK be the associated weights. By abuse of notation, we can define mDi =
∑K
k=1pkσk, which is
now an element of (Xi). Up to this identification, (mDu(mD)) can be seen as an element of ′.
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Definition 4.5. A game G admits a weak strategic approximation if there is a sequence
of finite sets Dn ⊂ M such that all accumulation points of mixed Nash equilibria of the
game restricted to Dn are approximate equilibria of G′.
Theorem 4.6. If a compact metric gameG′ is approximately better-reply secure, it has a
weak strategic approximation. Moreover, if a compact metric game admits a weak strate-
gic approximation, it has an approximate equilibrium.
The proof of the first part (in the Appendix) is an adaptation of Reny’s arguments
(Reny 2011), thanks to the notion of limit equilibrium. The second part is straightfor-
ward from the existence of accumulation points for every sequence in a compact set.
Remark 4.7. A condition that guarantees the existence of a weak strategic approxima-
tion was given by Blackwell and Girshick (1954) (see Theorem 2.3.3) in zero-sum two-
player games G = (X1X2u1u2). It could be stated as follows: for every  > 0, there
exists a finite set D1 ⊂ X1 such that, for every x1 ∈ X1, there exists a mixture σ1 of ele-
ments of D1 such that u1(σ1x2)≥ u1(x1x2)− ε for every x2 ∈X2. Assume this is true.
From the boundedness of payoffs, there exists a finite subset D2 ⊂X2 such that for every
x2 ∈ X2, there is d2 ∈ D2 with, ∀d1 ∈ D1 |u2(d1x2)− u2(d1 d2)| ≤ ε. Then every mixed
Nash equilibrium of the restriction of G to D1 ×D2 is an ε-Nash equilibrium of G (see
Blackwell and Girshick 1954 for more details). Thus, this game admits a weak strategic
approximation.
The following diagonal game does not satisfy the assumption of Blackwell and Gir-
shick, but satisfies the assumption of Theorem 4.8 below (and thus admits a weak strate-
gic approximation): consider X1 =X2 = [−11], u1(x1x2)= 0 if x1 = x2, u1(x1x2)= x1
otherwise, and u2 = −u1. If there exists a finite subset D1 ⊂ X1 satisfying the Black-
well and Girshick condition, taking x2 ∈ (01], which is not in D1 and x1 = x2, we get a
contradiction for ε > 0 small enough.
4.3 Applications
Non-quasiconcave two-player diagonal games
Theorem 4.8. Every two-player diagonal game in which h is continuous admits a weak
strategic approximation (and thus an approximate equilibrium in mixed strategies).
The proof of Theorem 4.8 consists of constructing a weak strategic approximation
(see Appendix A.5). Interestingly, the approximation is endogenous (i.e., game depen-
dent). The multi-player case is investigated in the next application.
Example 4.9. Sion and Wolfe’s zero-sum game shows that Theorem 4.8 can be false for
games with two lines of discontinuities instead of one (see Sion and Wolfe 1957). ♦
Some particular cases covered by Theorem 4.8 follow.
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Example 4.10 (Bertrand duopoly with discontinuous costs). Hoernig (2007) introduced
the following modification of Bertrand’s game: each firm i = 12 chooses a price pi ∈
[01]; the demand is D(p1p2) = max{01 − min(p1p2)}; the total (symmetric) cost for
each firm is C(q) = C˜ ∈ (0 14) if the production q is positive, and C(0) = 0 otherwise.
Assuming equal sharing at ties, Hoernig (2007) proved that the game has no mixed Nash
equilibrium. By Theorem 4.8, it has an approximate equilibrium. ♦
Example 4.11 (Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly with capacity constraints). There are two
firms. Firm i has an endowment of Ci units of the commodity (the capacity of a zero-
cost technology). Firms choose prices (p1 and p2). The firm choosing the lowest price
(say p) serves the entire market D(p) up to its capacity. The residual demand D(p)−Ci
is met by the other firm (up to its capacity as well). If the duopolists set the same price,
they share the market according to some rule h. If h shares the market in proportion to
the capacities, Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b) proved the existence of a mixed equilib-
rium. Theorem 4.8 proves the existence of an approximate equilibrium for every con-
tinuous h. ♦
Bayesian diagonal games and auctions with correlated types In many economic mod-
els, such as auctions, players do not have full knowledge about other player’s evalua-
tions. This leads naturally to the following class of Bayesian diagonal games. At stage 0,
a type t = (t1     tN) ∈ T = T1 × · · · × TN is drawn according to some joint probability
distribution p, and each player i is informed of his own type ti (correlations between
types are allowed). At stage 1, each player i is asked to choose an element xi ∈ [01]
(interpreted as a bid). The payoff of player i is
ui(txix−i)=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
fi(t xiφi(x−i)) if φi(x−i) > xi
gi(t xiφi(x−i)) if φi(x−i) < xi
hi(tx) if φi(x−i)= xi
where fi(t · ·) and gi(t · ·) are two continuous mappings on [01] × [01], and φi :
R
N−1 → [01] is a monotone aggregation function (see Application 3.14). The mapping
h is the tie-breaking rule and may be discontinuous (but is measurable). Actually, in
first-price auctions, for example, the tie-breaking rule may depend on how many play-
ers offer the highest bid. That is why in our definition, hi may be discontinuous and
have more arguments than fi and gi. The game is called a game of private values if for
every i, ui depends only on its own type ti and does not depend on t−i.
To avoid additional notation and measurability issues, we assume the type space T
to be finite. This assumption could be relaxed (see Remark A.2 in Appendix A.6).
Theorem 4.12. Every Bayesian diagonal game admits a weak strategic approximation
(and so a mixed approximate equilibrium)15 if for every i ∈ N and t ∈ T , one has the
following conditions:
15Importantly, for every ε > 0, the ε equilibria we build in the proof are tie-breaking-rule independent.
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(a) We have fi(t00)≤ hi(t0    0)≤ gi(t00).
(b1) We have fi(t11) ≥ hi(t1    1) ≥ gi(t11) or16 (b2) there is η > 0 such that
there is always a best response of each type in [01−η[.
(c1) There are only two players or (c2) values are private.
Example 4.13 (One unit first-pay, second-pay, and all-pay auctions). Take any N-
player auction where the winner is the player with the maximal bid. More precisely,
suppose that player i’s value for the object is vi(t) ∈ ]01[. If xi > x¯−i := maxj =i xj , i
wins the auction and pays a price pi(xi x¯−i)≥ 0. His final payoff is then gi(txi x¯−i)=
vi(t) − pi(xi x¯−i), where pi is continuous and nondecreasing in both variables, and
pi(y y) = y for every y. If xi < x¯−i, player i looses the auction and pays a transfer
τi(xi)≥ 0. His payoff is then fi(t xi x¯−i)= −τi(xi), where τi(xi) is continuous and non-
decreasing, and τi(0) = 0. In case of a tie (xi = x¯−i), the winner is selected uniformly
among the set of players with maximum bid. For example, in first-price and second-
price auctions, τi = 0. In all-pay auctions, τi = −xi. In first-pay and all-pay auctions,
pi(xi x¯−i) = max{xi x¯−i}; in second-price auctions, pi(xi x¯−i) = x¯−i. In this general
model, 0 = fi(t00) < gi(t00) = vi(t) and 0 ≤ hi(tx) ≤ vi(t), so that condition (a) is
satisfied. Condition (b1) is satisfied in first-price and second-price auctions, but not in
all-pay auctions. However, condition (b2) is satisfied in these three types of auctions
because player i always has a best response in [0maxt vi(t) + ε[. Thus Theorem 4.12
applies when there are two players or values are private. ♦
Example 4.14 (Multi-unit auctions). Consider the previous model with the following
modification: K homogeneous units of an indivisible good are sold, but each bidder i=
1    N (N ≥K) can buy only one unit of the good. Player i wins if his bids is among the
K highest bids. In case of a tie, the remaining winners are chosen at random among the
tied players. Theorem 4.12 applies, and here φ(x1     xN−1) is simply the Kth highest
of x1     xN−1. ♦
Example 4.15 (Double auction). Suppose player 1 is a buyer with a value v(t1 t2) ∈ ]01[
and player 2 is a seller with a cost c(t1 t2) ∈ ]01[. Player 1 chooses a maximum bid
x1 ∈ [01] and player 2 chooses a minimum price x2. If x1 < x2, there is no trade (so that
f1(tx1x2) = g2(tx1x2) = 0). If x1 ≥ x2, there is a trade at price p = (x1 + x2)/2, so
that h1(tx1x2)= g1(tx1x2)= v(t1 t2)− (x1 + x2)/2 and h2(tx1x2)= f2(tx1x2)=
(x1 + x2)/2 − c(t1 t2). Consequently, f1(t00) = 0 < h1(t00) = g1(t00) = v(t) and
f2(t00) = −c(t) = h2(t00) < g2(t00) = 0: condition (a) is satisfied. Condition (b1)
is satisfied similarly, but condition (b2) is not satisfied for the seller. Since the game has
only two players, Theorem 4.12 applies. ♦
16Conditions (b1) and (b2) are boundary conditions at 1. Condition (b1) is satisfied by first-price,
second-price, multi-unit, and double auctions, but not for all-pay auctions. Condition (b2) is true for all-
pay, first-price, second-price, and multi-unit auctions, but not for double auctions (see Examples 4.13, 4.14,
and 4.15).
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An open question is whether Theorem 4.12 holds for N-player diagonal games with-
out condition (c2). But without conditions (a) or (b), approximate equilibria may not
exist as the following zero-sum example shows.
Example 4.16. Consider a zero-sum timing game, viewed as a diagonal game with con-
stant payoff functions f , g, and h. Each player should decide when to stop the game
between 0 and 1. The game stops at the first moment when one of the two players stops.
If both players stop simultaneously before the exit time t = 1 or no player stops before
time t = 1, then there is a tie (payoff is given by h). Player 2 has two types A and B with
equal probabilities. Player 1 has only one type. If player 1 stops first, he gets f = 1. If
player 1 stops second he gets g = −1. The payoffs depend on the type of player 2 only
when the players stop simultaneously. If his type is A, player 1 has an advantage and
gets the payoff h= 3, and if his type is B, player 1 has a disadvantage and gets the payoff
h= −2. We can prove that maxmin≤ − 12 and that minmax≥ − 14 , so that the game has no
value and so no approximate equilibrium (see Appendix A.7). ♦
Remark 4.17. Theorem 4.12 is to be compared with the one in Jackson and Swinkels
(2005). They show the existence of a Nash equilibrium that is tie-breaking-rule indepen-
dent in multi-unit auctions with private values and uncorrelated types. Recalling that
when types are correlated, a Nash equilibrium may not exist (Fang and Morris 2006), the
existence of an approximate equilibrium is the best one can hope.
Remark 4.18. The existence of Nash equilibria for Bayesian games is well understood
for Bayesian games with continuous payoffs (Balder 1988, Milgrom and Weber 1985).
Recently, it has been extended to discontinuous payoffs under a uniform payoff security
assumption (e.g., Carbonell-Nicolau and McLean 2015), with application to auctions.
5. Conclusion
Our paper proposes a unifying framework to study the existence of approximate and
sharing rule equilibria in discontinuous games, which links Simon–Zame and Reny ap-
proaches in pure and mixed strategies.
In the first part, we focus on quasiconcave compact games in pure strategies. A new
relaxation of Nash equilibrium (the Reny solution) is shown to always exist. It provides
tight conditions, in the spirit of Reny’s conditions, that guarantee the existence of an ap-
proximate equilibrium. Reny’s solution is also used to solve an open problem in Jackson
et al. (2002), namely the existence of a sharing rule equilibrium in pure strategies (up to
now, existence was known only for games in mixed strategies). As applications, we prove
the existence of sharing rule equilibria in many economic models with discontinuous
preferences and approximate equilibria in a large class of diagonal games.
In the second part, we concentrate on metric compact games in mixed strategies. We
prove that the intersection between the sets of Simon–Zame and Reny solutions con-
tains the set of approximate equilibria. Moreover, this intersection is nonempty. This
shows that the three main solution concepts discussed in this paper are strongly con-
nected. As an application, we prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in a
large class of auctions with interdependent types and values.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.15
Under assumption (C), the game is payoff secure: indeed, if xi =φ(x−i), ui is continuous
at x; thus xi is secure for player i. If xi = φ(x−i), then player i can secure his payoff
(up to an arbitrary ε > 0), increasing or decreasing xi slightly or keeping it constant.
Consequently, if (x v) ∈  is a Reny solution of the game, then
sup
di∈[01]
ui(dix−i)= sup
di∈[01]
ui(dix−i)≤ vi ∀i ∈N (2)
Now, we prove that x is an approximate equilibrium profile by checking four differ-
ent cases. In the first case, assume for every player i ∈N , xi =φ(x−i). Thus, payoffs are
continuous at x and v = u(x). From (2), (x v) = (xu(x)) is a Nash equilibrium. In the
second case, there exists a player i such that xi =φ(x−i) ∈ ]01[. Then φ(x−j) ∈ ]01[ for
every j. Indeed, for every j = i, either xj ≥ xi > 0, and anonymity and representativity
imply that φ(x−j) > 0 and monotonicity implies that φ(x−j)≤φ(x−i) < 1, or xj ≤ xi < 1
and we get similarly φ(x−j) ∈ ]01[. Thus, the marginal continuity property is satisfied
at x, since for every player j ∈N , we have
sup
dj∈[01]
uj(djx−j)=max
{
sup
dj<φ(x−j)
fj
(
djφ(x−j)
)
 sup
dj>φ(x−j)
gj
(
djφ(x−j)
)}
from assumption (C) and from continuity of φ, fj , and gj . Thus, Corollary 3.13 im-
plies that (x v) is an approximate equilibrium. In the third case, there exists a player
i such that xi =φ(x−i)= 0. Then φ(x−j)= 0 for every player j: indeed, anonymity gives
φ(x−j) = 0 for every j such that xj = 0, and monotonicity gives φ(x−j) = 0 for every j
such that xj > 0. Now let (xn)n∈N be a sequence of profiles such that (xnu(xn))→ (x v).
For every player j such that xj = 0 and vj ≤ fj(00), we let ynj := 0 for every integer n and
let (ynj )n∈N := (xnj )n∈N: otherwise. This defines a sequence of profiles (yn)n∈N converging
to x. Let us prove that yn is an εn equilibrium for some εn → 0. From continuity of φ,
limn→+∞φ(yn−j) = φ(x−j) = 0 for every player j. In particular, from (2), and since gj is
continuous, we get
sup
dj∈[01]
gj(dj0)≤ vj (3)
Fix some player j ∈N , and consider three subcases:
• First, assume fj(00) = gj(00). In this case, from assumption (C), fj(00) =
gj(00) = h(0x−j), and thus dj → uj(djx−j) is continuous. In particular, vj =
uj(x) and (2) implies that player j plays optimally at xj . By continuity, player j
is εn-optimizing by playing ynj against y
n
−j (because y
n converges to x) for some
sequence of positive reals (εn)n∈N converging to 0.
• Second, assume vj ≤ fj(00) and fj(00) = gj(00). From (3), gj(00) ≤ vj ≤
fj(00), and since fj(00) = gj(00), we get fj(00) > gj(00). But this implies that
gj(·0) is nonincreasing on [01]: indeed, otherwise, for ε > 0 small enough, we
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would get a contradiction with the quasiconcavity of yj → uj(yj ε     ε) and the
inequality uj(0 ε     ε)= fj(0 ε) > uj(2εε     ε)= gj(2εε).
Consequently, we finally get
sup
dj∈[01]
gj(dj0)= gj(00) (4)
Moreover, since uj(0x−j) = hj(0x−j) ∈ ]gj(00) fj(00)[ (because of assump-
tion (C)), the fact that gj(·0) is nonincreasing on [01] also implies that xj = 0
(otherwise gj(00) < uj(0x−j) ≤ vj = uj(x) = gj(xj0) and (4) would be false). In
particular, by definition, this implies ynj = 0 for every n.
From gj(00) < fj(00), assumption (C), the continuity of gj and fj , (4), and the
fact that φ(yn−j) converges to 0, there exists a real sequence εn → 0 such that one
has
gj
(
φ(yn−j)φ(y
n
−j)
)− εn ≤ sup
dj∈[0φ(yn−j)]
fj
(
djφ(y
n
−j)
)− εn ≤ fj
(
0φ(yn−j)
)
(5)
sup
dj∈[01]
gj
(
djφ(y
n
−j)
)− εn ≤ gj
(
φ(yn−j)φ(y
n
−j)
)≤ hj
(
φ(yn−j) y
n
−j
)
(6)
and
gj
(
φ(yn−j)φ(y
n
−j)
)
<hj
(
φ(yn−j) y
n
−j
)
< fj
(
φ(yn−j)φ(y
n
−j)
)
 (7)
the last equation being true because the inequality gj(00) < fj(00) remains true
on a neighborhood of (00), and from assumption (C).
This implies that player j is 2εn-optimizing by playing ynj = 0 against yn−j : in-
deed if φ(yn−j) > 0, this is a consequence of (5), (6), and (7); if φ(y
n
−j)= 0, this is a
consequence of (6).
• Third, assume fj(00) = gj(00) and vj > fj(00) (thus ynj = xnj for every n). From
assumption (C) and the definition of vj , we deduce that fj(00) < hj(0x−j) <
gj(00), but from (3), gj(00)≤ vj , and we finally get
fj(00) < hj(0x−j) < gj(00)= vj (8)
Now, first assume xj = 0. Thus, we should have uj(xn) = gj(xnj φ(xn−j)) for n
large enough, which requires xnj > φ(x
n
−j) for n large enough. By monotonicity of
φ and since xni ≥ yni for every player i, we get ynj = xnj > φ(xn−j) ≥ φ(yn−j). Thus,
uj(y
n) = gj(ynj φ(yn−j)) and by continuity of gj , this converges to gj(00) = vj ,
when n tends to infinity.
From (3) and (8), we get
max
{
fj(00)hj(0x−j) sup
dj∈[01]
gj(dj0)
}
≤ gj(00) (9)
Since uj(yn) converges to gj(00), we get that ynj is an ε
′
n-best response against
yn−j for some sequence of positive reals (ε
′
n)n∈N converging to 0 (use continuity of
fj , gj and assumption (C)).
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Second, assume xj > 0. Since φ(x−j) = 0, uj is continuous at x and vj =
gj(xj0)= uj(x). From (2), xj is a best response against x−j ; thus we finally have
max
{
fj(00)hj(0x−j) sup
dj∈[01]
gj(dj0)
}
≤ uj(x) (10)
and, similarly to the previous case, from the continuity of fj and gj , assumption
(C), and the continuity of uj around x, we obtain that ynj = xnj is an ε′n-best re-
sponse against yn−j for some sequence of positive reals (ε
′
n)n∈N converging to 0.
This ends the three subcases, and x is an approximate equilibrium profile asso-
ciated to the sequence (yn)n∈N.
In the last case, we assume there exists i ∈ N such that xi = φ(x−i) = 1: this can be
proved as in the third case.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
The first inclusion is a consequence of Theorem 3.10 applied to G′.
For the second inclusion, consider a sequence (mnu(mn))n∈N∗ of 1/n-mixed Nash
equilibria converging to (mv). To prove that it is a mixed sharing rule equilibrium, we
show how to adapt Simon and Zame’s proof.
Note that the sequence (mn)n∈N converges (weakly) to m. We let E be the space
of RN -valued vector measures on X , endowed with the weak* topology. Consider the
sequence (u ·mn)n∈N of the compact space E (here u ·mn denotes the RN -valued mea-
sure on X defined by u · mn(F) = ∫F udmn for every Borelian set F of X). Without any
loss of generality, up to a subsequence, this sequence converges to some measure ν.
From Lemma 2 of Simon and Zame (1990, p. 867), there exists a Borel measurable se-
lection q of Q, the multi-valued function from X to RN , defined by Q(x) = cox, such
that ν = q ·m (remark that the proof of this lemma does not use the support of mn, but
only the fact that u is a selection of Q). Define, for every player i and every integer k> 0,
Hki = {xi ∈Xi :
∫
qi d(δxi ×m−i) >
∫
qi d(mi ×m−i)+ 1/k}. Let us prove that mi(Hki )= 0
for every integer k> 0.
Otherwise, consider K ⊂ Hki ⊂ U , where K is compact, U is open, mi(U − K) < ε
with ε > 0, and with mi(K) > 0. We let f : Xi → [01] be a continuous function that
is identically equal to 1 on K and 0 on the complement of U . Consider the strategy
βni = fmni /
∫
f dmni . Then ui(β
n
i m
n
−i) > ui(m
n) + 1/(2k) for n large enough and ε > 0
small enough (see Step 4 in Simon and Zame), which contradicts the fact that mn is a
1/n-Nash equilibrium (for n large enough). Thus mi(Hki ) = 0 for every integer k > 0.
Now let Hi = {xi ∈ Xi :
∫
qi d(δxi × m−i) >
∫
qi d(mi × m−i)}. Since Hi =⋃kHki , we get
mi(Hi)= 0.
From Step 5 in Simon and Zame, there exists a modification q˜ of q, such that
q = q˜ except on a set of m measure 0, such that m is a Nash equilibrium of the game
G˜ = ((Xi)i∈N (q˜i)i∈N), and q˜(m) = q(m). More precisely, take p˜i a Borel measurable
selection from Q that minimizes the ith component of Q, define T = {x ∈ X : xi ∈ Hi
for at least two indices i ∈ N}, define q˜(x) = p˜i(x) if x ∈ Hi × X−i but x /∈ T , and
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q˜(x) = q(x) otherwise. To prove that m is a Nash equilibrium of G˜, we follow Simon
and Zame. By contradiction, assume that some player i has a profitable deviation xi,
that is, q˜i(xim−i) > q˜i(m)+ η for some η > 0. Then the case xi /∈ Hi is not possible by
definition of Hi (see Step 6, Case 1 in Simon and Zame). The case xi ∈ Hi is as in Step
6, Case 2 in Simon and Zame, and implies that ui(ximn−i) > ui(m
n) + η/2 for n large
enough, a contradiction.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
A limit equilibrium (mv) exists by compactness of ′. First let us prove that it is a Reny
solution of ′. Fix d ∈ M . The definition of a limit equilibrium implies that for every
neighborhood V of (mv), there exists mV ∈M and D′ a finite subset of M containing d
such that (i) ∀i ∈ N∀d′ ∈ D′ui(d′imV−i) ≤ ui(mV ) and (ii) (mV u(mV )) ∈ V . Shrinking
V to (mv) implies that ui(dim−i)≤ vi, and since this is true for every d ∈M , (mv) is a
Reny solution of ′.
Now let us prove that (mv) induces a solution à la Simon and Zame. Since M is a
compact metric set, there exists a countable decreasing basis of neighborhoods V n of
(mv) in ′. Since X is a compact metric set, there exists a sequence Dn =∏i∈N Dni of
finite sets of pure strategies converging to X for the Hausdorff distance. By definition of
a limit equilibrium (Definition 4.2), for every integer n, there exists a sequence of finite
sets D′n =∏i∈N D′ni of mixed strategies containing Dn, and a probability mn, which is a
Nash equilibrium of the game restricted to D′n such that (mnu(mn)) ∈ V n. Recall that
Simon and Zame’s existence proof consists in approximating the game by a finite game
in pure strategies (here Dn), and in considering a weak limit of a sequence (mn)n∈N of
Nash equilibria of this approximation. We cannot apply Simon and Zame’s proof directly
to the Nash equilibria mn of the finite games D′n, because D′n may contain mixed strate-
gies. But D′n ⊃Dn: thus, no player i has a profitable deviation in Dni against mn, and we
shall prove that this property is sufficient to adapt Simon and Zame’s proof.
Let G˜, q˜, andHi be defined as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 (Section A.2 just above). To
prove that m is a Nash equilibrium of G˜, assume that some player i has a a profitable de-
viation xi to m−i that is, q˜i(xim−i) > q˜i(m). Then the case xi /∈Hi yields a contradiction
(Step 6, Case 1 in Simon and Zame). For the second case, simply consider a sequence xni
converging to xi such that xni ∈ Dni (here, we use that Dn =
∏
i∈N Dni converges to X for
the Hausdorff distance). A limit argument (Step 6, Case 2 in Simon and Zame) proves
that ui(xni m
n
i ) > ui(m
n) for n large enough, a contradiction, because mn is a Nash of D′n
and because xni ∈Dni ⊂D′ni .
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.6
Let V ⊂ ′ be the set of non-Reny solutions of G′. By definition, for every (mv) ∈ V ,
there exists V (mv) (a neighborhood of (mv)), d(mv) ∈ M , and a player i ∈ N such
that ui(d
(mv)
i m
′
−i) > v
′
i for every (m
′ v′) ∈ V (mv). This yields a collection of pairs
(V (mv) d(mv)) for every (mv) ∈ V . Since the set of Reny solutions is compact in ′,
V is open in ′; thus there is a countable family of pairs {(V ndn)}n defined as above
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such that V = ⋃n≥0 V n. Define Dni = {d1i      dni } and Dn =
∏
i∈N Dni for every integer
n, and let us prove that it is a weak strategic approximation of the initial game. We
only have to prove that if (mv) = limn→+∞(mnu(mn)), where (mnu(mn)) is a Nash
equilibrium of the game restricted to Dn (for every integer n ≥ 0), then (mv) is a Reny
solution (which implies that it is an approximate equilibrium, since the game is approx-
imately better-reply secure). By contradiction, assume (mv) is not a Reny solution. By
definition of V and V n (n ≥ 0), there exists some integer k such that (mv) ∈ V k and
(mnu(mn)) ∈ V k for every n large enough. By definition of V k, there is some player i
such that ui(dki m
′
−i) > v
′
i for every (m
′ v′) ∈ V k. In particular, ui(dki mn−i) > ui(mn) for
n large enough, which contradicts the fact that (mnu(mn)) is a mixed Nash equilibrium
of the game G′ restricted to Dn, since dki ∈Dni for every n≥ k.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.8
The proof of Theorems 4.8 and 4.12 uses the same principle: for every ε > 0, we con-
struct a finite approximation G′ε of G′ such that for every player i and every mixed strat-
egy of players j = i in G′ε, player i has an ε-best response that belongs to G′ε. This proves
that every mixed Nash equilibrium of the finite approximation is an ε-Nash equilibrium
of the initial game. The approximation shall depend on the structure of the game and,
in particular, on the behavior of the payoffs in a neighborhood of the boundary.
First note that in two-player diagonal games, necessarily φ(y)= y for every y ∈ [01]
(by the unanimity condition). Call x ∈ [01] a right local equilibrium if hi(xx) > gi(xx)
for both i= 12 and a left local equilibrium if hi(xx) > fi(xx) for both i= 12. Thus, if
players are supposed to play (xx) and if x is a right local equilibrium, no player has an
interest to deviate to some strategy in some right neighborhood of x (but he may have a
profitable deviation outside that neighborhood) and similarly for left local equilibria.
We let x0 be the largest element in [01] such that all x < x0 are right local equi-
libria and let y0 be the smallest element in [01] such that all y > y0 are left local
equilibria. Note that x0 may be 0 and y0 could be 1. By continuity of f , g, and h,
if x0 < 1, then hi(x0x0) ≤ gi(x0x0) for some i ∈ {12}, and similarly, if y0 > 0, then
hj(y0 y0) ≤ fj(y0 y0) for some j ∈ {12}. Depending on the relative position of x0 and
y0, we consider the three following cases.
First case: x0 > y0. In this case, the finite approximated game is simply defined by
some finite discretization D of [01] containing 0 and 1 and σ a mixed strategy of the
game restricted to D . Without any loss of generality, taking the mesh of this discretiza-
tion smaller than some η > 0, we can assume that the payoff functions f and g do not
change by more than ε/2 if a player moves by no more thanη, and such that if x < x0 is in
D, thenhi(xx) > gi(yx) for all x < y < x+η, and if x > y0 is inD, thenhi(xx) > fi(yx)
for all x > y > x− η. We let y ∈ [01] be some ε/2-best reply to σj of player i that is not
in D (if such strategy does not exist, we are done with the proof). Then either y < x0 or
y > y0. In the first case, denote by z the greatest element in D smaller than y, so that
hi(z z) > gi(y z) by assumption of the discretization and since z is a right equilibrium.
Since player j plays a probability distribution supported on D, moving from y to z for
player i induces for him a greater payoff from the event associated to player j playing z
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and at most a change of ε/2 on the events where player j is playing a strategy in D dif-
ferent from z. Thus, z is an ε-best reply for player i. A similar argument applies to y > y0
(use the left equilibrium property).
Second case: x0 < y0. This case implies that hk(x0x0) ≤ gk(x0x0) and hl(y0 y0) ≤
fl(y0 y0) for some k ∈ {12} and l ∈ {12}. By continuity, we get η> 0 small enough such
that hk(x0x0) < gk(xx0)+ ε/4 for every x ∈ ]x0x0 + η[ and hl(y0 y0) < fl(y y0)+ ε/4
for every y ∈ ]y0 −ηy0[. Thus, there are four cases to check, depending on the values of
k and l. Let us solve explicitly the case k = 1 and l = 2. The same idea of construction
could be done in the other cases, with a small adaptation in the definition of the weak
strategic approximation.
Fix ε > 0 and define x0 = t0 < s0 < t1 < · · ·< sK−1 < tK = y0, a discretization of [x0 y0]
with a mesh smaller than some η> 0 so that payoff functions f and g do not change by
more than ε/4 if the pure strategy moves by no more than η. As in the first case, we let D
be a finite discretization of [0x0[∪ ]y01] with a mesh smaller than η > 0 so that payoff
functions f and g do not change by more than ε/2 if the pure strategy moves by no more
than η and such that if x < x0 is in D, then hi(xx) > gi(yx) for all x < y < x+η, and if
x > y0 is in D, then hi(xx) > fi(yx) for all x > y > x+η. Now the finite approximation
of G′ is defined as follows: player 1 is restricted to play in D or uniformly on one of the
intervals [tk sk], k = 0    K − 1, or to choose tK = y0. Player 2 is restricted to play in
D or uniformly on one of the intervals [sk tk+1], k = 0    K − 1, or to choose t0 = x0.
Observe that the intervals where players are uniformly mixing are disjoint and alternate.
We let σ be some strategy of player 2 in the restricted game. Let y be some ε/4 pure best
response of player 1 in G, which is not in the discretization D (again, if it does not exist,
this is finished). Several subcases have to be examined. First subcase: If y < x0 or y > y0,
we proceed as in the first case to construct an ε-best reply in D. Second subcase: If y is
in some interval ]sk tk+1[ of player 2 (k ∈ {01    K − 1}), and if player 2 is choosing
that interval with positive probability, an easy computation proves that the payoff of
player 1 coming from that interval is, up to ε/4, a convex combination of his payoff
if he chooses tk+1 and his payoff if he chooses sk. But the payoff of player 1 coming
from player 2 playing in the other intervals or in D changes by no more that ε/4 when
he moves in the interval [sk tk+1]. Consequently, player 1 has a 34ε-best response at
the extreme points sk or tk+1 of the interval, a case that is treated in the next subcase.
Third subcase: Let z ∈ [tk sk] be a 34ε-best response, for some k ∈ {01    K − 1}. If
k > 0, by assumption, there is zero probability that player 2 stops in that interval and so
player 1’s payoff does not move by more than ε/4 if he plays uniformly in [tk sk] (which
is authorized for player 1) instead of playing z. This gives an ε-best response. If k = 0,
if player 2 is playing x0 with positive probability and player 1 is playing z = x0, then
player 1 does not lose more than ε/4 by playing slightly more than x0 instead of x0 (since
h1(x0x0) < g1(xx0) + ε/4 for every x ∈ ]x0x0 + η[). Then the case where z belongs
to the interval ]t0 s0[ remains. But, again, since his payoff moves continuously in that
interval, playing uniformly in it is an ε-best response. The proof for player 2 is similar
(we use the fact that h2(y0 y0) < f2(y y0)+ ε/4 for every y ∈ ]y0 −ηy0[).
The three remaining cases for k and l are solved similarly, by a judicious choice of
which of the two players is allowed to stop at x0 and y0: if k= 2 and l = 1, then player 1
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can stop at x0 and player 2 at y0; if k = 2 and l = 2, (only) player 1 is allowed to stop at
both x0 and y0; if k= 1 and l = 1, only player 2 is allowed to stop at both points. If some
player can stop at x0, then it is the other player who is authorized to stop uniformly in
the small interval of the discretization just after x0, and the intervals in which players
can stop (by mixing uniformly) alternate until the point y0, and the last interval belongs
to the player who is not allowed to stop at y0.
Third case: x0 = y0. This case implies hk(x0x0) < gk(xx0)+ ε/4 for x ∈ ]x0x0 +η[
and hl(x0x0) < fl(xx0)+ε/4 for x ∈ ]x0 −ηx0[ for some k ∈ {12} and l ∈ {12} (if x0 is
0 or 1, then only one of the inequalities holds). Suppose, for example, that h1(x0x0) <
g1(xx0) + ε/4 for x ∈ ]x0x0 + η[. We let D1 = {0 = t0 < · · · < tK} be a discretization
on the left of x0, not including x0, and empty if x0 = 0; let D2 = {s0 < · · · < sK = 1} be a
discretization on the right of y0, not including y0, and empty if y0 = 1. Again, without
any loss of generality, assume that the mesh of the discretizations is smaller than η> 0,
so that payoff functions f and g do not change by more than ε/2 if a player moves by
no more than η. Consider a strategic approximation where player 2 is allowed to play in
D1∪D2∪{x0} and player 1 to play inD1∪D2 or to mix uniformly in the length [x0 s0]. Let
y ∈ [01] be some ε/2-best reply of player 1 to some mixed strategy of player 2 that is not
in D1 (if such a strategy does not exist, this is finished). If y < x0, moving from y to the
greatest element in D1 smaller than y gives an ε-best reply for player 1. If y > x0, moving
from y to the smallest element in D1 larger than y gives an ε-best reply for player 1. Last,
if y = x0, playing uniformly in [x0 s0] instead of playing x0 is an ε-best reply for player 1,
because h1(x0x0) < g1(xx0)+ε/4 for x ∈ ]x0x0 +η[. We treat in a similar way the case
of player 2 and the case k= 2.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4.12
Recall that for simplicity, we assume the type space T to be finite.
Case (c2): the multiplayer private value setting. Define a weak strategic approxima-
tion of the initial game G as follows: for each integer m, a strategy (in Mi) of player
i (whatever his type) is some element of the finite set Dm of uniform distributions on
Ikm = [k/m(k+ 1)/m] (k ∈ {01    m− 1}). By the Nash theorem, this finite (Bayesian)
game has a mixed Nash equilibrium σm. We shall prove that if players j = i play accord-
ing to σm−i, each type ti of player i has some ε-best response (in G
′) that belongs to Dm.
This proves that σm is an ε-Nash equilibrium of G′ for m large enough.
Consider ε > 0, and suppose m is large enough so that for every t ∈ T , fi(t · y)
and gi(t · y) do not move by more than ε in the interval [k/m(k + 2)/m] (k =
0    m − 2) uniformly in y. If player i of type ti chooses a pure strategy x ∈ [01] and
if the realized strategy profile of its opponents is x−i, then its payoff can be written
wi(ti xφi(x−i)), where wi(ti xφi(x−i)) is almost surely equal to either fi(ti xφi(x−i))
or gi(ti xφi(x−i)) (ties have zero probability), depending on the position of φi(x−i)
with respect to x. This is because the image probability measure of σm−i by φi has no
atoms.17 It also implies that the (expected) payoff of player i, fixing the strategies of the
17To prove this, consider the event [φN(x1     xN−1) = α] for some α ∈ [01]. Let S = {(x1     xN−1) ∈
[01]N−1 :∑N−1k=1 xk = 1} be the (N − 2) simplex. The monotonicity assumption guarantees that for every
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opponents, is a continuous function of his own strategy x. Consequently, there exists
x∗ ∈ [01], a pure best response of player ti (in the original game G′). From x∗, one can
construct an ε-best response in Dm as follows: if x∗ ∈ [01/m], from assumption (a), re-
placing x∗ by the uniform distribution on I1m is an ε-best response for m large enough. If
k/m < x∗ < (k+ 1)/m for some k = 1    m− 2, then either gi(ti x∗x∗) ≥ fi(ti x∗x∗)
and then replace x∗ with the uniform strategy on Ik+1m (it is better for i to choose a higher
strategy), or gi(ti x∗x∗) < fi(ti x∗x∗) and then replace x∗ with the uniform distribu-
tion on Ik−1m (it is better for i to choose a lower strategy). In both cases, this gives an
ε-best response in Dm for m large enough. Last, if assumption (b1) is satisfied and (b2)
is not and x∗ ∈ [1− 1/m1], then replace x∗ with the uniform distribution on Im−1m .
Remark A.1. Note that this proof works also when the payoff of type ti depends also
on (ti t−i) if we add the assumption that for every player i and every x∗ ∈ [01], if
gi(tx
∗x∗) ≤ fi(t x∗x∗) is true for one t¯−i, then it is true for every t−i, and similarly
for the inequality gi(tx∗x∗)≥ fi(t x∗x∗). Finally, remark that the proof only requires
the (strict) monotonicity of φi, not the other properties.
Case (c1): the two-player general value setting. When there are two players, by una-
nimity φi(y)= y. Now we mimic the proof and the approximation scheme of the second
case of Theorem 4.8 with x0 = 0 and y0 = 1, proving that if σ is some mixed strategy
profile of player 2 in the approximated game, then every type t1 has an ε-best response
against σ in the full game that belongs to his set of authorized strategies. That is, take the
following discretization of [01]: 0 = s0 < t0 < s1 < t1 < · · ·< tK < sK+1 = 1. Player 1 is re-
stricted to play uniformly on one of the intervals [sk tk], k= 0    K, or to choose x= 1.
Player 2 is restricted to play uniformly on one of the intervals [tk sk+1], k= 0    K, or
to choose x = 0. Observe that the intervals where players are mixing are disjoint and
alternate (player 1 can stop uniformly in the first interval, player 2 in the second, player
1 in the third, etc.).
Remark A.2. In both cases (two players or private value with N players), by con-
struction, in the weak strategic approximation, ties have zero probability. Conse-
quently, the Nash equilibria are independent on the tie-breaking rule h. Also, by ex-
amining the proofs, one can see that the result of Theorem 4.12 holds when the type
space T is a compact metric set, functions fi(t ab), gi(t ab) are jointly continu-
ous in (t ab) ∈ T × [01] × [01], and hi(tx) is measurable and continuous in t uni-
formly in x. In that case, for every ε > 0, one can discretize the type space to obtain
a Bayesian diagonal game with finitely many types tε ∈ Tε. This game admits an ε
equilibrium (by Theorem 4.12) from which one can construct a 2ε equilibrium in the
(x1     xN−1) ∈ S, there is no more than one y ∈R such that φN((x1     xN−1)+y(1    1))= α. For every
x = (x1     xN−1) ∈ S, define ψ(x1     xN−1) = y if such y exists and ψ(x1     xN−1) = 0 otherwise. One
can identify S×R to a subset of RN−1 (which contains [01]N−1) throughout the mapping i : S×R→RN−1
defined by i((x1     xN−1) y) = (x1     xN−1)+ y(1    1). With this identification, the graph of ψ con-
tains the event [φN(x1     xN−1)= α]. But ψ is measurable, and thus its graph has a 0 Lebesgue measure
in RN−1 (from the Fubini theorem). The assertion follows from the fact that σm−i is a convex combination of
uniform probabilities whose supports are rectangles with nonempty interiors.
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original game by asking each type ti in the original game to play a strategy of a closest
type tεi in the game with finitely many types. If the discretization is well chosen so that
supx |ui(ti x) − ui(tεi  x)| ≤ ε, then type ti is playing a 2ε-best response in the original
game.
A.7 Proof of Example 4.16
Start with the maxmin. We let α be the probability with which player 1 stops at x= 0 (so
with probability (1 − α) he stops after zero). If α = 0, player 2 gets 1 by stoping at time
zero (and so player 1 gets −1). If α> 0, type A for player 2 can stop uniformly between 0
and some ε where ε is very small so that with high probability, if the game has not been
stopped at time zero, it is stopped by player 2 (just after zero). Assume that type B of
player 2 stops at time zero. Payoff of player 1 is thus very close to α( 12 × 1 + 12 × −2) +
(1−α)×−1. Consequently, the best strategy for player 1 against such behavior by player
2 is to stop at t = 0 with probability 1 so that maxmin≤ − 12 .
Let us now compute the minmax. Let us restrict player 1 to playing best replies to the
following kinds of strategies: (i) to stop at time t = 0 or (2) to stop uniformly between 0
and some ε very small, which depends of course on the strategy of player 2. Knowing
this behavior, type B must stop at time zero. We let β be the probability that type A
stops at time zero. The payoff of player 1 if he stops at 0 (choose option 1) is 12 × −2 +
1
2 × (β× 3 + (1 − β)× 1) = −12 + β, while if he chooses option (ii) his payoff is close to
1
2 × −1 + 12(β × −1 + (1 − β) × 1) = −β. Thus, the optimal β for type B against this
behavior of player 1 must be equalizing and so is β= 14 . Consequently, minmax≥ − 14 .
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